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AFRICA IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
Agent, bystander or victim?
Jo-Ansie van Wyk
Africa’s role and position in international relations has often been studied by
focusing on the role and impact of exogenous actors on the continent instead of
focusing on Africa’s role and impact on these exogenous actors and relations.
Conventional attempts to search for an African voice in discourses on its position
in international relations often focus on the victimhood of the continent by
emphasizing the exploitation, colonisation, discrimination, marginalization and
underdevelopment of the continent, which is here defined as the geographical area
which constitutes the continent. This definition corresponds with the membership
of the African Union (AU).
The discourse of Africa’s victimhood can result either in a political persecution
complex; political fatalism through a culture of passive bystandering; self-margin-
alization; and/or Othering in respect of the continent’s contribution to and
position in international relations. In contrast to the victimhood discourse, Africa
has made significant contributions to international relations. The continent was,
for example, one of the first continents to declare itself a nuclear weapons free
zone; it led the global campaign against apartheid; two Africans served as secretary-
generals of the United Nations (UN); African states have served on the UN
Security Council; African states form part of the Non-Alignment Movement
(NAM); Africa has adopted the Ezulweni Consensus on UN reform; and several
Africans are Nobel Laureates. In addition to this, Africans have served, and
continue to serve, in leadership positions in several multilateral organizations such
as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN Office for Outer
Space Affairs (UNOOSA). Moreover, the notion of ‘African solutions for African
problems’ is another reflection of African agency in international relations.
Africa as ontology asks the question: how do students of Africa conceptualize
what they study? This presupposes the acceptance of differences of ‘being’ and a
certain view about the nature of the world.1 Therefore, ontologically, this
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contribution postulates that Africa’s role and position in international relations have
several components, namely identity (agent, bystander and victim) and context
(structure).
However, Africa presents a number of ontological dilemmas. First, the continent
is not a monolithic actor and second, different historical experiences have resulted
in various notions of identities such as Francophone, Anglophone and Arab Africa.
How, then, does Africa and the world interpret its identity and role as an agent,
bystander or victim in international relations? Moreover, how is Africa represented
in international relations and how is it represented by others? Or is it The
Economist’s ‘hopeless continent’?2
The dilemma of interpretation and representation is that Africa and its IR
scholars can become complicit in maintaining hegemonic theoretical approaches
and discourses. Thus, ‘Knowledge – as truth claims rather than objective historical
facts – thus becomes intertwined with power, resulting in ‘regimes of truth’ that
perpetuate particular (unequal) relationships’.3 This complicity is evident in
Africans’ studies on the continent’s international relations and the study of IR on
the continent with the use ofWestern IR debates.4 Notwithstanding this, African
scholars were attracted to theoretical developments elsewhere such as the
Dependencia School in Latin America in the 1970s.5
Against the aforesaid, the purpose of this contribution is three-fold. First, it
attempts to survey some academic literature on African victimhood in contem-
porary international relations. Second, it attempts to dismiss the notion of Africa
as a passive bystander and a victim in international relations by illustrating African
agency in international relations, especially in nuclear non-proliferation,
disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy where the continent
continues to impact on the global agenda. The choice of this case study is
deliberate as this is an area where the continent has made important contri-
butions, which are explained below. Finally, the contribution attempts to indicate
African contributions to the study of international relations and how this can be
integrated into the universal study of international relations.
Context
Contemporary Africa finds itself within a particular international order. Whereas
the cold war provided a strange type of stability in the international system, the
immediate post-cold war international system was characterized by some
turbulence. During this period, the international system displayed a greater degree
of anarchy with no single powerful state; though some maintained that the US
achieved and maintained this position for some time until the international system
realigned itself. Once this realignment took place, the international system showed
some shifts in the axis between powers. Whereas cold war bipolarity was based on
ideological differences, the period after the cold war was characterized more by
economic differences between the developed and developing world and the
North–South division compared to the cold war’s East–West division.
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For Africa, the context within which it operates changed as well. Cold war
support and protection from either the US or its allies, or the Soviet Union and its
allies,was terminated or redefined. With the collapse of the Soviet Union,Moscow
remained the ally of some African states. However, it was no longer the Moscow
of the Soviet Union, but the Moscow of the Russian Federation. For a decade or
so as superpowers realigned themselves, Africa found itself marginalized; a situation
that changed on 11 September 2001 (hereafter 9/11) when Africa’s strategic
importance for the US and Europe in the ‘war on terrorism’ increased.6 In addition
to this, the continent is also experiencing China’s greater involvement in and
engagement of the continent.
Against the aforesaid, it is clear that the international context, within which the
continent operates, consists of four sub-contexts, namely multilateral intergovern-
mental organizations and negotiations such as the UN; bilateral relations with both
super and emerging powers; intra-regional cooperation; and sub-state or transna-
tional contexts.7 An example of Africa’s agency in multilateral intergovernmental
organizations and negotiations is the UN. Forming part of the largest group of
states, African states wield considerable voting power and form a strong bloc
advocating reform of the UN to reflect contemporary global realities and represent
the interests of less-developed states and continents. Further examples of African
agency include the continent’s role in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
(KPCS) to prevent the proliferation of conflict or so-called blood diamonds;
African membership of and participation in gatherings such as the Group of Eight
(G8) and the Group of Twenty (G20). Africa’s opposition to the US Africa
Command (AFRICOM) establishing its headquarters on the continent is another
example of its agency as AFRICOM continues to operate from its headquarters in
Stuttgart, Germany.
A more recent development illustrating African agency is its membership of
formations such as the India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) and the
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). One of the consequences
of this has been the increase in African involvement in South–South cooperation,
which, in turn, has resulted in greater foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa
from non-Western states such as India, Brazil, China and Turkey.8
In a bilateral context, African states could expand their relations with China, for
example, to the detriment of US demands and prescriptions in its relations with
certain African states. In a regional context, African agency has been improved
with the transition of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to theAU in 2002.
The first decade of the AU’s existence has enabled the continent to enter into
agreements with the European Union (EU) through the EU-Africa Partnership;
with China through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC); and with
Japan through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development
(TICAD). The importance of Addis Ababa (the headquarters of the AU and some
UN agencies) as a diplomatic capital is growing with several states with missions
to the AU. On a sub-regional level, African agency is evident in agreements such
that between the EU as the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
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Africa’s triangulated identity: Victim, bystander and agent
Africa has a unique cultural, economic and political context. This uniqueness is
duplicated among the differences between ethnic groups within the continent that
often stretch beyond Africa’s Westphalian state system. For the purpose of this
contribution, Africa’s identity is investigated in terms of three types of identity,
namely that of an agent, bystander or victim.
Victim
The notion of African victimhood has been the subject of both African and
international literature and the study of IR. The work of, for example, Chinua
Achebe, Edward Said, Mahmood Mamdani and Frantz Fanon supports empirical
evidence and the literature on Africa’s position in both international relations and
IR. Literature on Africa’s identity as a victim of colonialism, Western hegemony
and marginalization abounds.9 Empirical evidence continues to suggest that Africa
is not represented as a permanent member of the UN Security Council; that it is
not a major shareholder in international financial institutions such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and that the continent suffered
tremendously due to, inter alia, these institutions’ structural adjustment policies
(SAPs) and conditionalities. When the OAU adopted the Lagos Plan in 1980 it
stated clearly that the continent’s woes were the result of the West’s historical
injustices on the continent.10
In regarding itself as a victim, in terms of, for example, colonialism and
hegemonic Western academic traditions and global political agendas, Africa has
bestowed on itself a certain identity, which has several implications. First, by
identifying itself as a victim, Africa acknowledges its vulnerability and presupposes
the existence of a perpetrator. This supposes a power relation, which has at least
two actors, i.e. a dominant actor(s) and a dominated actor(s), resulting in
asymmetry and inequality. Another result of this inequality is that the continent has
not always been able to flex its own muscles on the international scene. This has
resulted in both the international and internal subjugation of the continent.
Second, one aspect related to victimhood is that of solidarity with other victims
resulting in a certain kind if intimacy between victims. Sharing the same identity
and a collective memory of victimization, victims sometimes align themselves with
other victims. Africa has often expressed solidarity with similarly dominated and
victimized countries and regions such as Latin America and some parts of the
Pacific. An example of the formalization and institutionalization of this solidarity
is the establishment of the NAM in 1955 and the OAU in 1963. With solidarity,
collective action can occur. This is often evident in bloc formation and bloc voting
at, for example, the UN.
The victim faces several dilemmas. First, it faces the dilemma of identification
and definition. What makes it a victim, and is it a legitimate claim accepted by
others? Second, is the actor still victimized? Finally, an identity as a victim can have
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unintended consequences. Jews, for example, are often reminded of their victim-
ization during the twentieth century’s Holocaust when called on to consider the
statehood of Palestine.
Earlier reference was made of solidarity as one of the unintended consequences
of victimhood. For Africa, solidarity with similarly less-development continents has
contributed to the continent’s agency in respect of certain international relations.
The continent, for example, forms part of the NAM, which represents the largest
grouping in the UN General Assembly. Similarly, the continent’s solidarity with
these countries has resulted in the strong voice of developing countries in negoti-
ations on, for example, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT).
Bystander
Defined in terms of what is does not do, a bystander is often accused of being passive
and not responding to a certain actor, event, threat or situation. Switzerland, for
example, may be defined as a bystander due to its centuries-long neutrality. The
bystander identity is often contextual, i.e. involving distance or proximity and a
social element (relations or not with the actor or event). Moreover, the bystander
identity is also situational, requiring the salience and the clarity of an actor,
condition, event or situation. A third element of the bystander identity is the ability
to define and interpret a particular actor, condition, event or situation. Depending
on this definition and the fourth element of this identity – a normative obligation
to act – an actor will decide whether it will remain passive (a bystander) or intervene
depending on its abilities, authority and influence and power (the fifth element).11
Africa is often accused of being a bystander in the enforcement of human rights
on the continent and, therefore, guilty of not honouring its continental and
international human rights obligations. This has resulted in African
inaction/passivity in respect of human rights violations such as the Rwandan
Genocide (1994) and the ongoing Darfur Genocide. Africa’s impunity of violators
has resulted in its international impunity of, for example, China; a major investor
in Africa and a declared violator of human rights. In the past decade, Africa’s trade
with China’s has increased from US$11 billion to US$166 billion.12 This has cast
doubts on the continent’s ability to resolve its own human rights crises, insecurity
and underdevelopment. Whereas bystanders may generally experience a sense of
helplessness of guilt ex post facto, Africa through continental organizations such as
the AU or regional organizations, has not even issued formal apologies in cases of
its passivity, or sanctioned contravening states. Notwithstanding this, Africa has
contributed to an understanding of justice and conflict resolution. For example,
Rwanda’s gacaca courts, established in 2001 and a localization of justice, are
contributing to new notions of grassroots justice and conflict resolution. These
courts completed their official mandate in 2012.
The bystander faces several dilemmas,which includes the definition of the actor
or situation, a feeling of powerlessness that may result in passivity, guilt,
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accountability and unintended consequences. In defining an actor or situation, the
bystander’s subjectivity often results in Othering. In identifying the ‘Other’, the
bystander may decide that it is not in its interests to act; often resulting in guilt
and/or questions of accountability in terms of the obligation to act.
Agency
Agency refers to the ability of an actor to set the international agenda in order to
set a new normative framework and/or advance its own interests. Agency,
therefore, refers to an actor’s influence and freedom of action and its material
and/or non-material ability to determine its destiny and affect its environment
(agency). It also includes the extent to which an actor’s destiny and ability is
determined by external actors (structure).13 Apart from freedom and ability, agency
also requires authority and influence to achieve a specific objective. Moreover,
agency also requires inventiveness and initiative.
Therefore, agency focuses on Clapham’s ‘view from below’.14 It also focuses on
political action by and objectives of African actors; especially in the context of the
structural limitations experienced by these actors. In order to determine African
agency, it is necessary to determine how much influence the continent exercises,
and how much freedom or how many options are available to the continent within
the limitations it experiences.15 In considering this, Brown and Harman offer
further insights into agency. They suggest that an analysis of agency should also
focus on the kind of agency exercised; the types of agents involved; the social
context; the political purpose of agency and agents; the instruments of agency; the
arenas and extent of African agency.16
The continental slogan ‘African solutions for African problems’ that emerged
during the 2000s provided further impetus for the continent’s agency. Since the
OAU adopted the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980, the continent attempted to
terminate the socio-economic legacies of colonialism.Despite its failure, the Lagos
Plan initiated a series of African-led initiatives and counterstrategies to improve
conditions on the continent and the continent’s international agency. Calling for
an African Renaissance, South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki led continental
efforts to engage with states and international actors such as the EU and the US.
By 2002, this has resulted in the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP), which
called for a partnership between Africa and developed countries. Despite some
differences on the continental agenda, African states adopted the New Partnership
for African Development (NEPAD) in October 2001, a month after 9/11, as a
refined successor of MAP. In 2002, the OAU was transformed into the AU, which
adopted NEPAD as its development strategy. Subsequent to these developments,
the EU signed new agreements with the AU; the US adopted the African Growth
and Opportunity Acts (AGOA I and II); and China entered the continent as a
major investor.
African agency was also evident during the cold war when it was able to play
the superpowers off against each other. Currently, Africa finds itself in a similar
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advantageous position in respect of superpowers’ efforts to acquire or maintain a
foothold on the continent. China has become the continent’s largest investor; a
major bargaining chip for African states in their relations with the EU and the US.
Moreover, African agency is clearly evident in the North’s greater interest in the
African continent through aid; the provision of security; a deepening of Africa’s
involvement in the multilateralism in the South; and the role of the continent in
the global war on terror.17
One example of the continent’s agency is the establishment of the African
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (ANWFZ) with the entry into force of the African
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty) on 15 July 2009, to
which we turn next as an illustrative case study.
African agency and nuclear non-proliferation
The 1960s was a geopolitical and nuclear turning point for Africa. The
independence of African states and the decolonization process on the continent
represent a major event in and contribution toAfrican agency. African leaders were
set to determine their countries’ destinies. In fact, African states, in some instances,
responded strongly to perceptions of Soviet (Egypt, for example, expelled the
Soviet Union in 1973) and Chinese influence on the continent. When the Chinese
Prime Minister Zhou En Lai stated in the early 1960s that Africa ‘was ripe for
revolution’ African leaders were offended and responded by limiting Chinese
activities on the continent.18
Considering that most African states gained independence in the 1960s; that the
cold war had intensified; that the OAU was established; and that France conducted
nuclear atmospheric tests in the Sahara Desert in February 1960, African states
responded by expressing their opposition to these tests by terminating diplomatic
relations (e.g. Nigeria); freezing French assets (e.g. Ghana); and by sponsoring a
1960 UN General Assembly resolution condemning the French tests.19 The
resolution, however, was not adopted due to a lack of international support.
As more African states became independent and faced new national and
continental security threats, Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first post-independence
president, observed ‘There are two threatening swords of Damocles hanging over
the continent, and we must remove them. These are the nuclear tests in the Sahara
by the French government and the apartheid policy of the Government of the
Union of South Africa’.20 Nkrumah’s government was one of the African
governments to freeze French assets in response to French atmospheric nuclear
tests in Africa. Moreover, Nkrumah’s stature as Africa’s first post-independence
president added weight to anti-nuclear sentiments on the continent. In 1961, a
larger number of African states supported the adoption of UN General Assembly
Resolution 1652 (XVI) (1961) on the Consideration of Africa as a Denuclearized
Zone, which declared Africa a nuclear weapon free zone. This resolution also
called on UN members to refrain from testing, storing or transporting nuclear
weapons in Africa.21
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The UN initiative was endorsed by the OAU. At the Inaugural Summit of the
OAU from 22 to 25 May 1963 French nuclear tests in Africa, which were
eventually terminated in 1966, were discussed under the agenda item of general
disarmament. Resulting from this discussion, the summit unanimously adopted a
resolution to declare Africa ‘a denuclearized zone’ and to ‘promote the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy’.22 At the first Assembly of Heads of States and Governments
of the OAU in July 1964, the organization adopted Resolution
AHG/Resolution11 (1) (1964) on the Declaration on the Denuclearization of
Africa (hereafter the Declaration). Moreover, the OAU committed itself to
negotiate an international agreement on this matter under the auspices of the
UN.23 When the Declaration was submitted to the UN General Assembly in
November 1965, the Assembly furthermore endorsed another resolution,
Resolution 2033(XX) (1965) on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in
Africa.24
Despite these developments in the 1960s and the subsequent formulation of a
Draft Convention for the Denuclearization of the Continent of Africa by the OAU
in 1964, a treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty) on Africa as a nuclear weapon free zone
only entered into force in July 2009.25 Several explanations for this can be offered.
As the cold war intensified, calls for a universal rather than a regional (African)
nuclear non-proliferation treaty increased. The resultant treaty, the NPT, only
entered into force in March 1970. Several African states participated in the negoti-
ations on the NPT, thus delaying the negotiation of a treaty on an African nuclear
weapon free zone, and they eventually became party to the NPT. In addition to
this and at the same time, South Africa’s status as a state with a nuclear weapons
capability contradicted the purpose of such an African treaty. In fact, South Africa’s
nuclear capability was a negation of Africa’s aim to keep the continent free from
nuclear weapons.
On 11 April 1996, OAU member states signed the Pelindaba Treaty in Cairo,
Egypt, and adopted the Cairo Declaration.26 As indicated previously, the OAU had
adopted its first resolution on the denuclearisation of Africa in Cairo in 1964. In
the 1996 Cairo Declaration,members of the OAU recognized the ‘valuable contri-
bution’ of nuclear weapons free zones to nuclear non-proliferation. In addition,
OAU members called on all non-nuclear weapons states (NWS) to ratify the
Pelindaba Treaty’s Protocols and to pursue the ‘complete elimination’ of nuclear
weapons.27 This formalized the territory covered by the ANWFZ. Annex I in the
Pelindaba Treaty includes a map of the ANWFZ that ‘extends across the entire
continent of mainland Africa’ and several islands, including the Agalega Island,
Bassas da India, the Canary Islands, Cape Verde, the Cardagos Carajos Shoals, the
Chagos Archipelago – Diego Garcia, Comoros, Europa, Juan de Nova,Madagascar,
Mauritius, Mayotte, Prince Edward and Marion Islands, Reunion, Rodrigues
Island, SãoTomé and Principe, Seychelles, Tomelin Island and Zanzibar and Pemba
Islands.
The provisions of the PelindabaTreaty require signatory states to undertake the
following:
Africa: Agent, bystander or victim? 115
6202 T&F Africa in Global International Relations:Royal Supps  6/8/15  13:27  Page 115
• renounce nuclear weapons (Article 3);
• prevent the stationing of nuclear explosive devices (Article 4);
• prohibit the testing of nuclear explosive devices (Article 5);
• declare, dismantle, destruct or convert nuclear explosive devices and facilities
for their peaceful development (Article 6);
• prohibit the dumping and storage of radioactive waste (Article 7);
• promote peaceful nuclear uses and verification of these peaceful uses (Articles
8 and 9);
• provide physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials, and prohibit
armed attacks on nuclear installations (Articles 10 and 11);
• establish the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) (Article 12);
• report and exchange information on nuclear activities (Article 13).28
Three protocols to the Pelindaba Treaty require extra-zonal states to comply with
the Treaty’s provisions (see Table 6.1). The AU has repeatedly indicated that the
failure of non-African countries and NWS to ratify the Treaty’s protocols has
hindered some African states from ratifying it. This weakens the Treaty and poses
a challenge to global non-proliferation. On 8 July 2011, the AU supported by the
US and the UN repeated calls on non-member African states to ratify the
Pelindaba Treaty and for NWS and Spain to ratify its protocols as prescribed
without further delay. The AU issued this call despite welcoming the long-awaited
Russian Federation’s ratification of the Treaty’s Protocol I and II on 11 March
2011, albeit conditional and thus contrary to the text of the Pelindaba Treaty.
On 8 July 2011, the AU also welcomed President Obama’s undertaking of 2
May 2011 to seek consent for Protocol I and II from the US Senate, reversing a
long-standing reluctance on the part of the US to ratify them. Obama expressed
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TABLE 6.1 Protocols of the Pelindaba Treaty
Protocol Obligations Open for Signed Ratified
ratification by
I NWS not to use or threaten to use a By all NWS By all NWS France
nuclear weapon against any Party to the China
Treaty and against any territory within UK
the ANWFZ
II NWS not to participate or assist in or
encourage the testing of a nuclear
explosive device in the ANWFZ
III Parties de jure or de facto in control of France France France
territories within the zone (France and Spain Spain
Spain) to apply the Treaty’s principles
in the territories under their control
Source: Pelindaba Treaty (2009)
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the belief that it was in the interest of the US to ratify Protocols I and II to
strengthen US relations with African allies. This would improve the security of the
US by serving the overall objective of non-proliferation and arms control;
demonstrate US commitment to the decisions taken at the 1995 Regional
Economic Community of the NPT; and contribute to the achievement of an
ANWFZ.29 China has ratified Protocol I and II, while France has ratified Protocols
I, II and III. The UK and Russia have ratified Protocols I and II but with provisos.
The UK objected to the inclusion of the Chagos Archipelago in the Treaty as an
infringement of the UK’s sovereignty, whereas Russia objected to the military base
of the US, a NWS, on Diego Garcia. For Russia, the presence of a NWS in an area
subject to denuclearization is counter to the objective of the Treaty.30 Spain has
neither signed nor ratified Protocol III. However, it remains equally disturbing that
the AU has not called on the world’s risky atomic weapons states in Asia and the
Middle East, namely India, Iran, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan to ratify the
Pelindaba Treaty.
The Pelindaba Treaty is an innovative development in respect of NWFZs and
the norm of nuclear non-proliferation. The AU has identified five innovations in
the PelindabaTreaty as a NWFZ treaty. First, it bans research into nuclear explosive
devices by any means in the zone’s territory (Articles 3, 4 and 5). Second, it requires
the destruction of nuclear devices that a state may have had prior to the Treaty’s
entry into force (Article 6). In the third instance, it prohibits the dumping of
radioactive waste and other radioactive matter anywhere in the ANWFZ (Article
7). The fourth innovation is that armed attacks by conventional and other means
against nuclear installations in the ANWFZ are prohibited (Articles 10 and 11).
Finally, the Treaty supports states’ use of nuclear science and technology for
peaceful purposes (Article 8).31
Conclusion
It could be argued that Africa has been a victim and bystander in respect of global
nuclear issues as exogenous actors extracted the continent’s uranium resources,
enriched it and armed with nuclear weapons determined the global agenda since
the end of the SecondWorldWar until the end of the cold war.32
In assessing African agency in nuclear non-proliferation in the form of the
Pelindaba Treaty is it evident that the continent skillfully operated in all of the
contexts referred to above. By elevating nuclear non-proliferation to a continental
(at the OAU and AU) and international (UN) context, the continent influenced
the global agenda, preventing non-proliferation as outlined in the PelindabaTreaty.
The case study presented here highlights some of types of agents involved,
namely certain individual states such as Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria with
strong political leaders as agenda setters and domestic and continental decision
makers. The case also illustrated the types of agency Africa exerted. These kinds of
agency include activism (by calling for a NWFZ), reformism (by expanding on the
content of NWFZs) and revisionist (by showing Africa’s ability, power and
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influence vis-à-vis traditional nuclear powers and requiring these states to sign the
Treaty’s protocols).
The case study also revealed the instruments of African agency, namely bilateral
and multilateral diplomacy. Negotiation rather than conflict has been Africa’s
preferred instrument. This raises questions on the purpose and consequences of
African agency. Surely,material and non-material gains are to be made fromAfrican
successes in this area.Materially, the continent can set the rules for the extraction of
its uranium extraction and export, and thus gain financially. Non-material gains
include the status and prestige associated with a particular normative stance (i.e. the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy) that expresses power through solidarity and influence.
Africa remains characterized by a triangulated identity (agent, bystander and
victim). Africa’s contribution to the study of IR is significant. Less significant is a
unique African approach to IR; one that questions Western ideas and contributes
to an understanding of IR and international relations. In order for Africa and its
scholars to achieve this, a research agenda is proposed. This agenda could include
a (comparative) study of Africa’s empires such as that of Shaka Zulu or the Ashanti;
city-states such as Mapunbupwe and Great Zimbabwe; leaders such as the Kabaka
and the Asantehene.
Second, a proposal is made for a pan-African research project on teaching IR in
Africa, African IR and the status of Africa’s voice in IR. This could result in
identifying, for example, a Johannesburg School, an Algiers School, a Cairo School,
a Lagos School or a Mombasa School of African IR. A study or the identification
of schools such as these could be able to capture the African voice in international
relations and contribute to African theory building in IR.
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